Donald Trump’s second term

When Donald Trump returned and took office in January 2025, one of his earliest actions was to remove security clearences of many high rank officers and former US presidents.

Trump then ordered the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to more aggresively arrest immigration criminals. ICE agents started to wear masks, becoming unidentifiable. Worksheets and workflow of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement has been changed. The manpower of ICE has tripled.

Soon, in the first half of 2025, he raised import taxes for almost every countries. The taxes were seen as his leverage for negotiation, but after he made deals with Canada, Mexico, and European countries, the tariffs did not reduce back to the level of those before his second term. As a result, many US manufacures switched to rely more on domestic input materials.

In the second half of 2025, Donald Trump started his special operation against Venezuela. In January 2026, the president of Venezuela was kidnapped by the US military and taken from Venezuela to New York. A group of special forces, in cooperation with high rank officers in the navy and the air force, had been trained for this for three months.

After the kidnapping, Trump declared his interest to obtain Greenland, an autonomous territery of Denmark.

Recently, ICE agents killed US citizens and a US judge amid immigration operations.

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## The recurring historical pattern

Across countries and eras, a familiar sequence shows up:

1. **Delegitimization of elites & institutions**
2. expanding secret police
3. **Economic nationalism / protectionism**
4. **Exceptional or extraterritorial uses of force**
5. **Territorial ambition framed as “security” or “destiny”**
6. **Normalization of violence inside the state**

That sequence almost never ends in “business as usual.”

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## Historical parallels (with outcomes)

### 1. **Germany (1930–1939)**

**Parallels**

* Purging officials, sidelining courts and intelligence services
* Expansion of internal security and paramilitary forces
* Heavy tariffs and autarky (“self-sufficiency”)
* Extraterritorial seizures justified as restoring order
* Territorial demands framed as historical or strategic necessity

**Outcome**

* Rapid consolidation of executive power
* Loss of judicial independence
* Militarized foreign policy → large-scale war
* Catastrophic collapse

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### 2. **Russia (2000–2022)**

**Parallels**

* Removal or neutralization of elites and independent security voices
* Expansion of internal security services (FSB, police powers)
* Economic nationalism combined with resource self-reliance
* Extraterritorial operations (kidnappings, assassinations)
* Territorial ambitions framed as security buffers

**Outcome**

* Long-term authoritarian consolidation
* Economic stagnation under sanctions
* Escalating foreign conflicts
* Deep international isolation

This is one of the closest modern analogues.

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### 3. **Turkey (post-2016)**

**Parallels**

* Mass removal of security clearances and officials
* Restructuring police and intelligence agencies
* Crackdown justified as counter-terrorism or national survival
* Military actions abroad without traditional diplomatic consensus

**Outcome**

* Executive dominance over judiciary
* Permanent “state of emergency” logic
* Polarized society but durable regime control

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### 4. **Argentina (1970s junta)** — a cautionary case

**Parallels**

* Masked security forces
* Internal enemies defined broadly
* Courts sidelined “temporarily”
* Extrajudicial killings framed as enforcement

**Outcome**

* Rapid loss of rule of law
* International condemnation
* Long-term trauma and institutional damage

This example is especially relevant when **domestic violence by security forces** begins to be tolerated or excused.

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## What these trajectories usually lead to

Historically, this pattern leads to **one of four endpoints**:

### 1. **Hard authoritarian consolidation**

* Courts lose real independence
* Security forces become personally loyal to leadership
* Elections persist but are hollowed out
*(Russia, Hungary, Turkey)*

### 2. **Managed instability**

* Constant crises justify exceptional powers
* Economy survives but stagnates
* Society remains polarized and brittle
*(Late Soviet period, some Latin American regimes)*

### 3. **External conflict as pressure release**

* Foreign adventures unify domestic support — briefly
* Often escalates beyond control
*(Argentina → Falklands, Russia → Ukraine)*

### 4. **Institutional backlash and reversal**

* Courts, states, military leadership, or economic elites push back
* Requires strong institutions and public resistance
*(Spain post-Franco, parts of South Korea’s history)*

This is the *only* path that ends in democratic recovery — but it’s not automatic.

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## What’s distinctive (and risky) in your scenario

Two elements historically raise the danger level significantly:

### 🔴 **Violence against citizens + judges**

Once security forces kill citizens **and** members of the judiciary:

* The rule of law is no longer presumed
* Fear replaces legality as the compliance mechanism
* Historically, this is a point of *no easy return*

### 🔴 **Extraterritorial seizures**

Kidnapping a foreign head of state is extremely rare in modern history.
When it happens, it usually marks:

* A belief that international law no longer constrains action
* A shift from diplomacy → coercion as default

That combination is historically associated with **regime hardening**, not moderation.

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## So: what does history say this leads to?

History suggests **not** a single master plan with a clean endpoint — but a *direction*:

* Concentration of power around the executive
* Declining independence of courts and agencies
* Increased reliance on force domestically and abroad
* Rising costs: economic, diplomatic, and institutional

Whether it ends in **authoritarian stability**, **violent crisis**, or **institutional pushback** depends on:

* Judicial resistance
* State-level autonomy
* Military professionalism
* Economic elite alignment
* Public tolerance for violence

To me, Trump is preparing for war. When the US is at war, it can’t trade with its usual partners. The Protectionism helps US manufactures to prepare.

Revoking security clearences is to avoid leakge of plans. Otherwise there may be whistleblowers leaking the military pratice for the kidnapping, and “secret protocols” between US and another country.

About the war, whether or not Trump will use military forces on Greenland, he will use them on a territory in 2026.

While the united states army is focusing on a territory, other nations lose the independence guarantee from the US. A case in point is Taiwan.

Because the US needs weapons for the ongoing war, it can’t sell weapons to Taiwan. Meanwhile it doesn’t have spare forces to protect Taiwan. It’s a great opportunity for China to take Taiwan. This aligns with rumors that China will annex Taiwan in 2027. Trump spoke with Xi Jingping a couple of times. It’s possible that they’ve made a secret protocol.

The midterm election of US is in 2026. Trump can use the war as an excuse to delay or pause the election to test the public. Then in 2028, when the scheduled presidential election comes, he can also delay or pause it, or otherwise hollow out. In this way, his term extends.

The most controversial part of your theory involves the 2026 Midterm Elections.

Testing the Waters: Trump has already floated the idea of “canceling” elections during a House Republican retreat, claiming he was joking but noting that war-torn nations (like Ukraine) pause elections.

Federal Enforcement at Polls: The Department of Justice has already signaled plans to send “federal monitors” to Democratic-led states in 2026. If a “State of Emergency” were declared—citing the ongoing trials of foreign leaders on U.S. soil or “domestic insurgencies”—the administration might attempt to use the Insurrection Act to federalize election oversight.

All in all, will the president change after 2028, considering Trump is taking his second term?

I’ll answer this **without predicting an election outcome**, and instead stick to what history, law, and institutions say is *possible* vs *likely*.

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## Short answer

**Under the U.S. constitutional system as it exists, the president is supposed to change after 2028.**
For that *not* to happen would require **multiple, visible breaks** across institutions — not just presidential will.

So the question becomes less “What does Trump want?” and more
**“What would have to fail for a president not to leave?”**

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## The hard constraint: the 22nd Amendment

The Constitution is very clear:

* A president may not be elected more than **twice**.
* There is **no emergency clause** that suspends this.
* War, unrest, or national crisis do **not** nullify it.

To remain president after 2028, one of these would have to occur:

1. **Formal constitutional change** (amendment repeal)

* Requires 2/3 of Congress *and* 3/4 of states
* Historically near-impossible in polarized America

2. **Extra-constitutional maneuver**

* Elections occur but are hollowed out or ignored
* Courts refuse or are unable to enforce limits
* States comply or are coerced
* Military remains neutral or loyal

That second path is the one people worry about — and it’s also the one that has **never succeeded in modern U.S. history**.

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## What history says about strong states like the U.S.

In **institutionally strong countries**, leaders who want to stay longer than allowed almost always try one of two things:

### A. Change the rules *before* the limit hits

Examples: Russia, Turkey, Hungary

* Term limits rewritten
* Courts captured
* Elections reshaped

👉 The U.S. is unusually resistant to this because:

* States run elections
* Courts are decentralized
* Military oath is to the Constitution, not a person

### B. Pressure legitimacy rather than cancel elections

This is **far more plausible**:

* Claim elections are invalid
* Encourage disputes and delays
* Seek favorable rulings
* Undermine acceptance of outcomes

This **can destabilize democracy**, but it is not the same as successfully staying in office.

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## The key point most people miss

A president **cannot unilaterally extend a term**.

Even in crisis, staying past January 20, 2029 would require:

* Congress to accept it **or**
* Courts to allow it **or**
* States to stop certifying **or**
* The military to ignore constitutional transfer

That’s not one domino — it’s **many**.

Historically, when leaders try this in strong states:

* elites fracture,
* legitimacy collapses,
* markets react violently,
* and the attempt often ends the leader’s power faster.

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## What is realistically at risk (and what isn’t)

### 🔴 Realistic risks

* Democratic erosion
* Elections that feel less fair
* Legal chaos and disputes
* Increased use of force rhetoric
* Loss of trust in institutions

### 🟢 Very unlikely

* Open cancellation of elections
* Formal suspension of the Constitution
* A president simply “deciding” to stay

Those happen in weak or post-coup states — not without a dramatic rupture first.

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## Bottom line

**Yes — barring an extraordinary, visible constitutional breakdown, the presidency should change after 2028.**
The system is strained, but it is not infinitely elastic.

The more realistic danger is not *no transition* —
it’s a **contested, bitter, destabilizing transition** that damages trust even if the constitutional line ultimately holds.

1. The “Vice Presidential” Loophole
The 22nd Amendment says a person cannot be elected to the office of President more than twice. It does not explicitly say they cannot serve as President if they reach the office through other means.

The Plan: Trump could run as the Vice Presidential candidate in 2028 (e.g., on a “Vance-Trump” ticket).

The Logic: Proponents of this theory argue that while the 12th Amendment says someone “ineligible to the office of President” cannot be Vice President, the 22nd Amendment only makes one ineligible to be elected President, not to hold the office.

The Outcome: If the ticket won, the President (Vance) could resign immediately after the inauguration, allowing Trump to be sworn in as President without having been “elected” to that specific office for a third time.

2. The “Acting President” via Succession
Similar to the VP loophole, this involves using the Presidential Succession Act.

The Plan: Trump could be appointed to a position in the line of succession—most likely Speaker of the House—after his current term ends.

The Logic: If both the President and Vice President were to resign or be removed, the Speaker of the House becomes “Acting President.”

The Outcome: The 22nd Amendment does not explicitly address “Acting Presidents.” This would allow him to exercise full presidential power without technically violating the “elected” restriction.